The green barrier to free trade
At the end of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons.
First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult.
Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new ‘Doha Round’ of trade negotiations is useful and feasible.
Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take ‘all-or-nothing’ scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries.
The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime.
There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by.
But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time.
This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade.
在世贸组织农业谈判委员会的最后一轮会议结束时,谈判者们要想在截止日期3月31日预见与会国家在充分准备的贸易谈判回合中通过构建它们自由化的承诺来达成具体数值目标,准则和其它的“意识形态”还不容乐观。此目标非常重要基于2个原因。第一,显而易见地,尤其是乌拉圭会议更加证明了:在农业方面达成共识注定是极其困难的。
农业谈判要取得进展,关键在于说服那些持怀疑态度者相信新一轮的“多哈会议”是有帮助和可行的。
第二,“多哈声明"让农业谈判成为了需在2005年1月1日完成的"单一承诺"的一部分。这就是说,在"要么全赞同,要么全否定"的方案里,与会国家必须在新一轮准备中的谈判上就所有领域能达成并遵守协议。这就意味着,如果没有就农业达成一致,多边贸易框架管理行业,服务或相关领域就停止不变,新领域诸如竞争政策,外资投资和公开招标采购也将没有进展,而这些都对发达国家的经济议程非常重要。
在多种的原因情况下农业就成为了难点。所以在最后一轮谈判上,在发达国家之间就构建适合的全球农业贸易框架达成协议极少。
美国,欧盟和农业出口国凯恩斯集团组织中的发达国家之间的议程有很大的不同。当富国和强国意见不一时,那么全球共识就很难达成。
但这并非全部,即使富国之间能达成一致,在《布莱尔宫协议》的操纵控制下,让世界其它国家达成一致更加困难。
这是因为自乌拉圭会议农业协议开始贯彻执行,其结果远远低于预期。在会议期间,乌拉圭谈判框架的主张者们已承诺会有全球的生产调整以增加全球农业贸易产值和增加发展中国家从此贸易中的分享。
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以上本人花了几十分钟自译,绝不是机器。应该能满足你的需求。 本人有很多翻译经验。本回答被提问者采纳