The green barrier to free trade
At the end of the latest round of meetings of the agricultural negotiations committee of the WTO, the optimism that negotiators would meet the March 31 deadline for working out numerical targets, formulas and other "modalities" through which countries can frame their liberalisation commitments in a new full-fledged round of trade negotiations has almost disappeared. That target was important for two reasons.
First, it is now becoming clear, that even more than was true during the Uruguay Round, forging an agreement in the agricultural area is bound to prove extremely difficult.
Progress in the agricultural negotiations was key to persuading the unconvinced that a new ‘Doha Round’ of trade negotiations is useful and feasible.
Second, the Doha declaration made agricultural negotiations one part of a `single undertaking' to be completed by January 1, 2005. That is, in a take ‘all-or-nothing’ scheme, countries had to arrive at, and be bound by, agreements in all areas in which negotiations were to be initiated in the new round. This means that if agreement is not worked out with regard to agriculture, there would be no change in the multilateral trade regime governing industry, services or related areas and no progress in new areas, such as competition policy, foreign investment and public procurement, all of which are crucial to the economic agenda of the developed countries.
The factors making agriculture the sticking point on this occasion are numerous. As in the last Round, there is little agreement among the developed countries themselves on the appropriate shape of the global agricultural trade regime.
There are substantial differences in the agenda of the US, the EU and the developed countries within the Cairns group of agricultural exporters. When the rich and the powerful disagree, a global consensus is not easy to come by.
But that is not all. Even if an agreement is stitched up between the rich nations, through manoeuvres such as the Blair House accord, getting the rest of the world to go along would be more difficult this time.
This is because the outcomes in the agricultural trade area since the implementation of the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) began have fallen far short of expectations. In the course of Round, advocates of the UR regime had promised global production adjustments that would increase the value of world agricultural trade and an increase in developing country share of such trade.
在最后的会议的最新一轮的世贸组织农业谈判委员会,乐观的态度,谈判可能可以满足于3月31日的最后期限为制定目标数量化、配方和其他“形式主义”,通过它的国家能勾勒他们的自由化承诺在一个新的如日中天的一轮的贸易谈判几乎已经消失。目标是重要的,原因有两个。
第一,它是现在变得清晰,甚至比是真的在乌拉圭回合达成的协议,锻造的农业地区注定要证明非常困难。
农业谈判进展是关键,一个新的劝说很不服气的多哈回合的贸易谈判是有用的,也是可行的。
第二,使农业谈判多哈宣言的一部分的“单身事业要完成2005年1月1号。也就是说,在拍全有全无分配的计划,国家都尽力到达,并遵守、协议在各领域里,谈判是在开始在新的一轮。这就意味着,如果协议没有制定关于农业,就不会有变化的多边贸易体制治理行业、服务或相关地区、没有进步在新的领域,如竞争政策,外国投资和公共采购,所有这一切都是非常关键的经济议程的发达国家。
这使得农业的症结因素在这种场合有很多。在最后一轮中,很少有协议的发达国家自己在适当的形状的全球农业贸易体制。
有实质性的差异在议程的美国、欧盟和发达国家在凯恩斯群的农产品出口国。当那位富有的和强大的不同意,一个全球共识是不容易搞到。
但这还不是所有。即使一个协议之间的缝富有的国家,通过诸如布莱尔大厅演习一致,得到世界上其他地方的人,一起去将更困难。
这是因为结果在农业贸易区域实施后,乌拉圭回合农业协议(你的)(农产品协定的)开始已经远不及人们对他的期望。在本课程中圆的拥护者们你的政权所承诺的全球生产的调整,这将增加的价值并增加了世界农业贸易的份额在发展中国家的贸易往来。